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**U.S. Department of Homeland Security**  
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
*Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090*  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

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FILE: LIN 07 021 52563 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: OCT 06 2009

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]

Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

**ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:**

[REDACTED]

**INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

*John F. Grissom*  
John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The employment-based immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a nursing staffing agency. It seeks to place the beneficiary with an employer in the United States as a nurse pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). The petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, which was not certified by the Department of Labor. The Form ETA 9089 indicates in Block H that the minimum level of education required for the position is a bachelor's degree in nursing and that experience in the job is not required.

The director determined that the Form ETA 9089 failed to demonstrate that the job requires a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent of an alien of exceptional ability and, therefore, the beneficiary cannot be found qualified for classification as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree or an alien of exceptional ability. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4). The director denied the petition accordingly. The director also noted three additional deficiencies in the petition. The director indicated that the petitioner failed to establish (1) that it has made a bona fide offer of full-time, permanent employment to the beneficiary; (2) that the petitioner gave proper notice of the filing of a Schedule A application as mandated by 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d); and (3) that the petitioner failed to establish that it has the ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wage as well as the wages of the nine other beneficiaries for whom the petitioner has filed I-140 petitions. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

On appeal, counsel fails to address the director's primary basis for denying the petition, i.e., the petitioner's failure to demonstrate that the job requires a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent of an alien of exceptional ability. Instead, counsel argues that the "actual petitioner" is Medstar Health, Inc. ("Medstar") and that Medstar will permanently employ the beneficiary. The petitioner is only paid a "one time finders fee." Counsel also argues that Medstar's ability to pay the proffered wages is "beyond question."

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: "A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree." *Id.*

Section 203(b)(2) of the Act also includes aliens "who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences, arts or business, will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States." The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) defines "exceptional ability" as "a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered."

Here, the Form I-140 was filed on October 27, 2006. On Part 2.d. of the Form I-140, the petitioner indicated that it was filing the petition for a member of the professions holding an advanced degree or an alien of exceptional ability.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4) states in pertinent part that "[t]he job offer portion of an individual labor certification, Schedule A application, or Pilot Program application must demonstrate that the job requires a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent of an alien of exceptional ability."

In this case, the job offer portion of the Form ETA 9089 indicates that the minimum level of education required for the position is a bachelor's degree in nursing and that experience in the job is not required. Accordingly, the job offer portion of the Form ETA 9089 does not require a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent of an alien of exceptional ability, and the appeal must be dismissed.

Furthermore, as noted by the director, the petition is deficient, and may not be approved, for three additional reasons.<sup>1</sup>

First, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has made a bona fide offer of full-time, permanent employment to the beneficiary as the alien's actual employer.

The petitioner has applied for the beneficiary under a blanket labor certification pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.5, Schedule A, Group I. *See also* 20 C.F.R. § 656.15. Schedule A is the list of occupations set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 656.5 with respect to which the Department of Labor (DOL) has

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<sup>1</sup> An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d at 1002 n. 9.

determined that there are not sufficient United States workers who are able, willing, qualified and available, and that the employment of aliens in such occupations will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of United States workers similarly employed.

Based on 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(a)(2) and (l)(3)(i) an applicant for a Schedule A position would file Form I-140, “accompanied by any required individual labor certification, application for Schedule A designation, or evidence that the alien’s occupation qualifies as a shortage occupation within the Department of Labor’s Labor Market Information Pilot Program.”<sup>2</sup> The priority date of any petition filed for classification under section 203(b) of the Act “shall be the date the completed, signed petition (including all initial evidence and the correct fee) is properly filed with [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)].” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Pursuant to the regulations set forth in Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the filing must include evidence of prearranged employment for the alien beneficiary. The employment is evidenced by the employer’s completion of the job offer description on the application form and evidence that the employer has provided appropriate notice of filing the Application for Alien Employment Certification to the bargaining representative or to the employer’s employees as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d). Also, according to 20 C.F.R. § 656.15(c)(2), aliens who will be permanently employed as professional nurses must have (1) passed the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing Schools (CGFNS) Examination, or (2) hold a full and unrestricted license to practice professional nursing in the [s]tate of intended employment, or (3) that the alien has passed the National Council Licensure Examination for Registered Nurses (NCLEX-RN).

Finally, the regulations require that the actual "employer" file the Form I-140. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(1). The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.3 states:

*Employer* means a person, association, firm, or a corporation which currently has a location within the United States to which U.S. workers may be referred for employment, and which proposes to employ a full-time worker at a place within the United States or the authorized representative of such a person, association, firm, or corporation.

In *Matter of Smith*, 12 I&N Dec. 772 (Dist. Dir. 1968), the petitioner, a staffing service, provided a continuous supply of secretaries to third-party clients. The district director determined that the staffing service, rather than its clients, was the beneficiary's actual employer. To reach this conclusion, the director looked to the fact that the staffing service would directly pay the beneficiary's salary; would provide benefits; would make contributions to the beneficiary's social

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<sup>2</sup> On March 28, 2005, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.17, the Application for Permanent Employment Certification, Form ETA 9089, replaced the Application for Alien Employment Certification, Form ETA 750. The new Form ETA 9089 was introduced in connection with the re-engineered permanent foreign labor certification program (PERM), which was published in the Federal Register on December 27, 2004, with an effective date of March 28, 2005. See 69 Fed. Reg. 77326 (Dec. 27, 2004).

security, worker's compensation, and unemployment insurance programs; would withhold federal and state income taxes; and would provide other benefits such as group insurance. *Id.* at 773.

In *Matter of Ord*, 18 I&N Dec. 285 (Reg. Comm. 1992), a firm sought to utilize the H-1B nonimmigrant visa program and temporarily outsource its aeronautical engineers to third-party clients on a continuing basis with one-year contracts. In *Ord* at 286, the Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioning firm was the beneficiary's actual employer, not its clients, in part because it was not an employment agency merely acting as a broker in arranging employment between an employer and a job seeker, but had the authority to retain its employees for multiple outsourcing projects.

In *Matter of Artee*, 18 I&N Dec. 366 (Comm. 1982), the petitioner was seeking to utilize the H-2B program to employ machinists who were to be outsourced to third-party clients. The commissioner in this instance again determined that where a staffing service does more than refer potential employees to other employers for a fee, where it retains its employees on its payroll, etc., the staffing service rather than the end-user is the actual employer. *Id.*

In this matter, the petitioner admits on appeal that it will not employ the beneficiary. To the contrary, the petitioner claims that Medstar will be the beneficiary's actual employer, that Medstar will be paying the beneficiary, and that the petitioner will only be paid a one-time finder's fee.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the petitioner is not the actual employer in the instant matter. Medstar has not filed a Form I-140 and has not signed a Form ETA 9089 pertaining to the proposed employment. It is further noted that the petitioner may not amend the current petition to replace itself with Medstar as the petitioner. A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. See *Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1988). Instead, the appropriate remedy would be to file another petition with the proper fee and required documentation. Accordingly, the petitioner in this matter is not entitled to the benefit sought, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason.

Second, the petitioner has failed to establish that it gave notice of the filing of the Schedule A application pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d), which provides in pertinent part:

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<sup>3</sup> The record contains a Service Provider Agreement (Agreement) dated May 19, 2005, between the petitioner and Harbor Hospital, a member of Medstar, for the provision by the petitioner of registered nurses and other medical personnel to Medstar. While the Agreement provides that the petitioner will pay all wages, workers' compensation and unemployment compensation owed to its personnel, counsel's assertions on appeal contradict the terms of the Agreement. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Further, the petitioner has provided no evidence to establish that the Agreement was in effect as of the priority date in 2007.

- (1) In applications filed under § 656.15 (Schedule A), § 656.16 (Sheepherders), § 656.17 (Basic Process); § 656.18 (College and University Teachers), and § 656.21 (Supervised Recruitment), the employer must give notice of the filing of the Application for Permanent Employment Certification and be able to document that notice was provided, if requested by the certifying officer as follows:
  - (i) To the bargaining representative(s) (if any) of the employer's employees in the occupational classification for which certification of the job opportunity is sought in the employer's location(s) in the area of intended employment. Documentation may consist of a copy of the letter and a copy of the Application for Permanent Employment Certification form that was sent to the bargaining representative.
  - (ii) If there is no such bargaining representative, by posted notice to the employer's employees at the facility or location of the employment. The notice must be posted for at least 10 consecutive business days. The notice must be clearly visible and unobstructed while posted and must be posted in conspicuous places where the employer's U.S. workers can readily read the posted notice on their way to or from their place of employment . . . In addition, the employer must publish the notice in any and all in-house media, whether electronic or printed, in accordance with the normal procedures used for the recruitment of similar positions in the employer's organization.

As correctly noted by the director, the record is devoid of evidence that the petitioner has given proper notice pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Third, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

Here, the petitioner(s) identified on the Form I-140 admit on appeal that they are neither the "actual petitioner" nor the future employer of the beneficiary. The petitioner(s) claim that Medstar will employ the beneficiary and that "Medstar's assets and ability to pay the beneficiary nurses are beyond question, which evidence has been previously provided." However, each petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate record. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(d).<sup>4</sup> In making a determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information contained in the record of proceeding. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii). Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190).

Furthermore, even if the petitioners' ability to pay were relevant to this petition, the director correctly concluded that the evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner(s) have the ability to pay both the proffered wage and the wages of the nine other beneficiaries for whom the petitioner(s) have filed Forms I-140. The primary petitioner, which appears to be United Nursing Agency and Recruitment Services, Inc., cannot combine its resources with another party, [REDACTED] PC, and "share" responsibility for the beneficiary. The regulations foresee only one individual employer filing a petition, not joint employers pooling resources and filing petitions collectively. *See generally* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l) and 20 C.F.R. § 656.3(1). Moreover, the petitioners' 2005 tax returns indicate that the petitioners each had -\$10,741.00 and \$22,185.00 in net income<sup>5</sup> respectively and \$8,472.00 and \$156,448.00 in net assets<sup>6</sup> respectively. Even combined together, it has not been established that either or both have the ability to pay the proffered wage and the wages of the nine other beneficiaries for whom the petitioner(s) have filed Forms I-140.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

<sup>5</sup> For an S corporation filing a 2005 Form 1120S, ordinary income (loss) from trade or business activities is reported on Line 21 of Form 1120S, and income/loss reconciliation is reported on Schedule K, Line 17e. When the two numbers differ, the number reported on Schedule K is used for net income.

<sup>6</sup> Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities. A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18.

<sup>7</sup> The petitioner's reliance on appeal on the balances in its bank accounts is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the

Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if he shows that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

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petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that is being considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets.